The fulfillment of the pedagogical intention of this work takes the form of developing a specific conception of metaphysics. The author’s conception is not the original one in terms of the object of metaphysics, but one that encompasses as well the various philosophical developments that affect the original conception of it, including critiques of it. The author conceives metaphysics in terms of "motives" of thought, originally articulated by Plato, namely, 1) the knowledge of principles of being; 2) the standard of (...) true knowledge; and 3) the way in which this knowledge is attained. According to the author, the first definitive treatment of the first of these themes is given by Aristotle, in the conception of the essences of things as the principles of being. In subsequent treatments, these themes undergo various transformations, which are presented by the author as being the result of critical reflections on prior treatments. In fact, they are the result of shifts in perspective, the most fundamental of which is, as the author himself notes, the introduction of perspectivity as a category in the sense of a condition of knowledge. The author traces the function of this category in the thought of various philosophers from Augustine to Nietzsche, suggesting, though not explicitly establishing, its theological origin. (shrink)

This volume, published to commemorate the two-hundredth anniversary of Hegel’s birth, is a collection of fifteen essays on Hegel, all in German, written by men from various European countries and with various professional backgrounds. The subject of the first two essays is Hegel the man: the essays are contributions to Hegel’s biography and psychography, and are of little philosophical interest. The subject of the remaining essays is Hegel’s work, at least that part of it which is judged by the contributors (...) to this volume to be of more than historical interest. This is primarily the practical-philosophical part of Hegel’s work. Specifically, the essays deal with Hegel’s philosophy of history ; his philosophy of religion ; and his philosophy of law. (shrink)

The subject matter of Ward’s book is Kant’s view of the nature of morality. Its object is to show that there is a development in Kant’s view, not only from the precritical to the critical stage of his thought, but also within the critical stage of his thought. The occasion for writing this book, it should be noted, is the prevalence of "verdicts" regarding Kant’s view of the nature of morality formed by British scholars on the basis of an acquaintance (...) of only the major critical works of Kant. According to Ward, an adequate understanding of Kant’s view of the nature of morality can come only from a reading of all of Kant’s works, most especially from a reading of his final, posthumously published, notes. In these notes, Kant equates God with practical reason. The significance of this equation is that it finally provides a stable solution to the problem of the foundations of morality, a problem which had occupied Kant since the beginning of his philosophical career. Kant’s precritical works, as well as the critiques, provide only unstable solutions. In his pre-critical works, Kant oscillates between seeking the foundations in knowledge and feeling. In his critiques, Kant seems to find a stable solution by conceiving reason as the source of principles, both theoretical and practical. The instability of this solution lies in the fact that Kant retains, along with the formal principles, a morality the source of which is religion. In the critiques, however, Kant is unable to conceive religion as anything more than a supplement to morality. Not until his final notes, Ward argues, does Kant recognize this instability and rectify it by giving religion an integral place in his conception of morality.—W. A. S. (shrink)